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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
misrepresent, (3) accuracy, due to the care with which such treatises are
written. In any event, "it must be admitted that those who write with no
view to litigation are at least as trustworthy, though unsworn and unex-
amined, as perhaps the greater portion of those who take the stand for a
fee from one of the litigants." 3 Wigmore (2d ed., 1923) par. 1692.
H. A. G. '35.
INSURANCE-ENGAGED IN AERONAUTICS-OCCASIONAL PASSENGEns.-Judi-
cial construction of exception clauses relating to aviation in life and accident
insurance policies is still a matter of doubt despite numerous decisions.
Where insured, passenger in an airplane, was killed as a result of the fall-
ing of the machine, and plaintiff sued on two life insurance policies provid-
ing for double indemnity for accidental death, held: the death resulted from
"engaging, as a passenger or otherwise, in submarine or aeronautic opera-
tions" within an exception in the double indemnity clause. Goldsmith v. New
York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 273.
Where the insurance contract denies liability if the injuries resulted from
"participating in aeronautics," aviation or the like, cases are uniform in
stating that a passenger in an airplane, commercial or otherwise, cannot
recover. Bew v. Traveler's Ins. Co. (1921) 95 N. J. L. 533, 112 Atl. 859;
Pittman et al. v. Lamar Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1927) 17 F. (2d) 370,
certiorari denied 274 U. S. 750; Head et al. v. New York Life Ins. Co.
(C. C. A. 10, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 517; First National Bank of Chattanooga v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1933) 62 F. (2d) 681; Traveler's
Ins. Co. v. Peake (1921) 82 Fla. 128, 89 So. 418; Meredith v. Business Men's
Accident Assoc. (1923) 213 Mo. App. 688, 252 S. W. 976; Vance, Insurance
(2d ed. 1930) 902. But if the clause reads "engaged in aeronautics" or its
equivalent Courts have generally been moved to construe the policy more
strictly against the insuror and hold the occasional passenger without the
exception on the ground that "engaged" involves an element of continuity,
of active employment or occupation, and does not relate to a single act.
Benefit Association of By. Employees v. Hayden (1927) 175 Ark. 565, 299
S. W. 995; Masonic Accident Ins. Co. v. Jackson (1929) 200 Ind. 472, 164
N. E. 628, overruling 147 N. E. 156; Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
(1929) 133 Misc. Rep. 780, 233 N. Y. Supp. 500; Gits v. New York Life
Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 7,1929) 32 F. (2d) 7; Price v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1929) 98
Fla. 1044, 124 So. 817; Flanders v. Benefit Association of By. Employees
(1931) 226 Mo. App. 143, 42 S. W. (2d) 973; Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co.
(1930) 202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848; see also Stone, J., dissenting in the
present case.
So far there seems to be little difficulty in interpretation, but when the
wording of the policy is varied, as in the present case, the problem of the
judges is greatly increased. If the word "operations" is added to "engaged
in aviation" there is an even stronger indication of a continuous occupational
relation, and the scope of the exception to the insuror's liability is further
narrowed. Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., and First National Bank of
Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra. "As a passenger or
otherwise" has been present in several policies which have been the sub-
ject of judicial consideration beside the one under discussion, and it has been
accepted as evidence of an intention on the part of the insuror to exclude
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this class of cases from the benefits of the contract, although there has been
no definite statement that this alone will be sufficient to bar liability in all
cases. Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S. (1931) 256
N. Y. 208, 176 N. E. 144; Blonski v. Bankers Life Co. (1932) 209 Wis. 5,
243 N. W. 410.
It seems to be a fair inference in almost all of the cases that the clauses
have been incorporated with the purpose in view of entirely eliminating re-
sponsibility for this type of accident. Especially is this true of policies
written, as the present one was, before 1925; that is, before the time when
the aviation industry became a major one and air travel a normal occur-
rence. At that time merely riding in aircraft was regarded as highly dan-
gerous and the companies presumably had no desire to include it among the
risks insured against. See Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
U. S., supra; Reeder, Aircraft Clauses in Accident Policies (1931) 2 Mo. Bar.
Journ. (no. 8) 7. And although the Courts have argued that the insured
might often be unaware of this intention, where "as passenger or otherwise"
is added the words would seem to give him notice.
But the basic difficulty in this and other cases where it is used is the word
"engaged." The insurors advance the contention that it is to be understood
in the same way as engaging in automobiling, tobogganing or some other
form of sport or entertainment, and so used a single act is included; while
beneficiaries argue that its meaning is similar to engaged in railroading or
the drama-some type of business or occupation implying sustained or mul-
tiple activity. The word clearly has two different meanings dependent upon
the concept with which it is associated. That aviation is a business at the
present time and more than a single trip would be necessary to render a per-
son "engaged" in it is incontestable; but that it was so before 1925 is open to
doubt. And if not the decision in the instant case has a sounder basis. In
any event, the highly technical nature of the reasoning is apparent in all the
cases, and in the absence of legislation it would seem that a uniform and
more definite clause in the insurance policies would eliminate the necessity
of much tortuous construction. T. S. M. '36.
NEGLIGENCE--LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER TO THIRD PERSON FOR DAMAGE
TO PRoPRYr.--The defendant, a manufacturer of paints and varnishes, sold
a secret preparation to a contracting company whose employee used it in
waterproofing the interior of a tank belonging to a third person. The prep-
aration, containing benzine and kerosene, exploded, destroying the tank and
the barn in which it was placed. The insurers, subrogated to the rights of
the owner, seek to recover from the defendant on grounds of negligence.
The jury found negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to warn
against the use of the preparation near fire. Held: The defendant, manu-
facturing a product imminently dangerous to life and property, is liable for
damage caused to property by its negligence. Genesee County Patrons Fire
Relief Assn. v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., et al.; Cooperative Fire Ins. Co. of
Wyoming and Genesee Counties v. Same (N. Y. App. 1934) 189 N. E. 551.
Ever since the case of Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 10 M. & W. 109 it
has been the recognized general rule that a manufacturer is not liable to
third persons who have no contractural relations with him for negligence in
the manufacture or sale of the article. Huset v. J. L Case Threshing Ma-
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